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LABOR l.Aw-CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING-DUTY oF EMPLOYER TO SUBSTAN-
TIATE CLAIM OF INABILITY TO PAY-A union had been recognized by an 
employer for three years. Pursuant to a reopening clause in the current 
contract the union asked for a IO-cent wage increase. The company main-
tained that it was paying above average wages and could not afford more 
than a 2½-cent hourly raise. When the union asked to be shown the com-
pany's books as proof of this claim of inability to pay, the company refused 
on the ground that the union had no legal right to such information. The 
National Labor Relations Board found that the company had failed to 
bargain in good faith with respect to wages1 in violation of section 8 (a) (5) 
of the amended National Labor Relations Act.2 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court from denial of enforcement by the court of appeais,s held, reversed, 
three justices dissenting in part. A refusal to attempt to substantiate a claim 
of inability to pay increased wages may support a finding of failure to bar-
gain in good faith. National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Manufactur-
ing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).4 
The Supreme Court stated that it was not holding that employees were 
entitled to substantiating data in every case where an employer pleads pov-
erty in opposition to a wage increase,5 and the facts of the case make it 
uncertain whether or not employers will always be required to produce such 
data. As the dissent pointed out, the majority in fact affirmed the Board's 
application of a per se rule, and on the record respondent's conduct showed 
little evidence of bad faith other than its refusal to open the books. Thus, 
it may follow from Truitt that, as a practical matter, an employer will be · 
required, on request, to attempt to substantiate his daim of inability to 
increase wages in virtually every case.6 
l Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954). 
2 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (a) (5). 
3 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., (4th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 869. 
4 Justices Frankfurter, Clark and Harlan dissented in part because they felt the Board 
had ruled that Truitt's failure to supply financial data constituted per se a refusal to 
bargain in good faith. They thought that the case should be remanded so that the Board 
could consider the issue of good faith from the totality of the evidence on the conduct of 
the negotiation. 
5 Cf. the statement, "If such an argument [inability to pay increased wages] is impor-
tant enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to 
require some sort of proof of its accuracy." Principal case at 152-153. 
6 See B. L. Montague Co., 116 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 38 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1956); NLRB v. 
F. W. Woolworth Co., (9th Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 319, revd. 352 U.S. 938 (1956). 
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The exact scope of the Truitt rule, however, is none too clear. The 
holding in the principal case was simply that an employer who makes a 
claim in bargaining must, on request, offer "reasonable proof" to show that 
his claim is honest.7 Yet requests £or information in collective bargaining 
often arise £or other reasons, e.g., to enable the union to police the contract 
or to bargain intelligently.8 It is apparently felt that the rule of the Truitt 
case requires disclosure in any of these situations.9 Another problem is 
raised by the principal case because the Court dismissed a defense that the 
data involved matters exclusively within the province of management. 
There was no clear indication, though, whether this was because the re-
quested data was not "management" data or because even management data 
is not protected.lo 
Several alternatives remain open to the employer who wants neither to 
increase wages nor to open his books to the union. The employer may still 
be able, theoretically at least, to show his good faith without in £act sub-
stantiating his claim. The employer may be able to avoid the problem by 
eschewing the defense of inability to pay and contending that ability to pay 
is irrelevant in the particular bargaining situation.11 Also, the Court has 
not foreclosed the possibility that a refusal to reveal economic data might 
be justified by showing that disclosure would be unduly burdensome or 
injurious to the business.12 
7 See also NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 680. 
s See Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 tl950) (financial condition); Hughes 
Tool Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 208 (1952) (wage rates and rate classifications); B. F. Goodrich Co., 
89 N.L.R.B. 1151 (1950) (salaries and merit ratings), remanded (6th Cir. 1951) 29 L.R.R.M. 
2052; Aluminum Ore. Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1942), enforced as mod. (7th Cir. 1942) 131 
F. (2d) 485 (wages and wage histories). 
9 See note 6 supra. 
10 The court of appeals had thought the test was whether the information related to 
matters with which bargaining was properly concerned. Thus, it felt there was no duty 
to supply financial data because it related to managerial policies and such policies were 
outside the scope of compulsory bargaining. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., note 3 supra. 
Management has insisted that such things as accounting policy, dividends, manufacturing 
costs and the business' general condition are not within the compulsory bargaining area 
defined by 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d) ("wages, hours and other terms 
and conditions of employment"). See 3 PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT CON· 
FERENCE 47-52 (1945). Labor feels that such information is essential to bargain intelli-
gently. See Barkin, "Financial Statements in Collective Bargaining," 4 LAB. L.J. 753 (1953). 
There is some belief, also, that labor should be a partner in determination of many so-
called entrepreneurial policies. See symposium, "What Kind of Information Do Labor 
Unions Want in Financial Statements?" 87 J. ACCOUNT. 368 (1949). See generally Sherman, 
"Employer's Obligation To Produce Data for Collective Bargaining," 35 MINN. L. REv. 24 
(1950). The Supreme Court in the principal case perhaps reversed the lower court be-
cause (1) the data involved was relevant to a subject of compulsory bargaining, (2) the 
duty to disclose is not limited by the subject of the bargaining, (3) there is a duty to 
bargain about some managerial policies, or (4) an employer will not be permitted to make 
an arbitrary claim in bargaining regardless of the data on which it is based. 
11 Both parties in the principal case considered ability to pay as relevant to the bar-
gaining. Compare BACKMAN, ECONOMIC DATA UTILIZE.DIN WAGE ARBITRATION 40, 42 (1952), 
with Barkin, "Financial Statements in Collective Bargaining," 4 LAB. L.J. 753 (1953). 
12 Principal case at 151. 
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In the principal case there was no indication of what would happen 
once an employer supplies the union with the requested information. The 
NLRB customarily does not look at the reasonableness of bargaining posi-
tions in determining good faith. In extreme cases, however, it might con-
ceivably find that on the basis of the information revealed the employer 
could not plead poverty in good faith.13 Even where the data evidenced 
the employer's good faith, disclosure might have serious consequences. 
Whether given economic data indicates inability to increase wages is a 
matter of judgment and not simply a question of fact.1 4 Thus, the employ-
er's real motive in withholding the information might be that he does not 
wish to "bargain" about what the data shows and perhaps even about 
proper financial policies for his business.15 Certainly an employer should 
not be able to plead poverty when his claim is not honest, but employers 
may have other reasons1 6 for wanting to withhold economic data bearing 
on their financial conditions. The Court leaves to conjecture and to future 
delineation the full implications of its decision. 
John Fildew 
13 See generally Smith, "The Evolution of the 'Duty to Bargain' Concept in American 
Law," 39 MrCH. L. REv. 1065 at 1094-1098, 1100, 1107 (1941). 
14 See Dunlop, "The Economics of Wage-Dispute Settlement," 12 LAw &: CoN1'EM. 
PROB. 281 at 293 (1947). 
15 The practical effect of this might be to throw many so-called managerial policies 
into the bargaining arena. There is still doubt, however, as to whether these subjects are 
within the scope of compulsory bargaining. See note 10 supra. There is a distinction 
benveen bargaining as to (I) whether an employer who admittedly can afford a wage 
increase should grant one, and (2) whether an employer can afford a wage increase at all. 
It is the latter issue which management feels should be determined unilaterally. 
16 In addition to the reasons discussed in the text, disclosure is often resisted on the 
ground that it will mean a loss of confidential data to competitors. It is not made clear in 
the principal case whether this reason can ever be used as a defense. 
